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Abstract – The central banks introduced a series of quantitative easing programs and 
decreased the long term interest rates to near zero with the aim to ease the credit conditions and 
provide the liquidity into the financial systems, responding to the 2007-2013 financial crisis in 
the USA, UK, Western Europe, and Japan. We review the U.S. Federal Reserve System, 
European Central bank, Bank of England and Bank of Japan monetary and financial policies 
with the particular focus on the quantitative easing policy implementation in the USA. 
Discussing some aspects of the quantitative easing policy implementation, we highlight the fact 
that the levels of capital change quickly in both the quantitative easing transmission channels and 
the transaction networks channels during the quantitative easing policy implementation, when 
the liquidity is added to the financial system. In agreement with the recent research findings in 
the econophysics, we propose that the nonlinear dynamic chaos can be generated by the turbulent 
capital flows in both the quantitative easing transmission channels and the transaction networks 
channels, when there are the laminar - turbulent capital flow transitions in the financial system. 
We demonstrate that the capital flows in both the quantitative easing transmission channels and 
the transaction networks channels in the financial system can be accurately characterized by the 
Reynolds numbers. We explain that the transition to the nonlinear dynamic chaos regime can be 
realized through the cascade of the Landau – Hopf bifurcations in the turbulent capital flows in 
both the quantitative easing transmission channels and the transaction networks channels in the 
financial system. Finally, we clarify that the general approach to the modeling of the US 
economy is based on both 1) the "large" empirically-motivated regression model, and 2) the 
Value at Risk (VAR) model with the incorporated Smets-Wouters model, which don’t take to the 
account the origination of the nonlinear dynamic chaos regime during the capital flow in the 
quantitative easing transmission channels and in the transaction networks channels in the 
financial system. Therefore, we completed the computer modeling, using both the Nonlinear 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Theory (NDSGET) and the Hydrodynamics Theory 
(HT), to accurately characterize the US economy in the conditions of the QE policy 
implementation by the US Federal Reserve. We found that the ability of the US financial system 
to adjust to the different levels of liquidity depends on the nonlinearities appearance in the QE 
transmission channels, and is limited by the laminar – turbulent capital flows transitions in the 
QE transmission channels and the transaction networks channels in the US financial system. The 
proposed computer model allows us to make the accurate forecasts of the US economy 
performance in the cases, when there are the different levels of liquidity in the US financial 
system. 
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Introduction 
 
“The practice of monetary policy has evolved a great deal since the early 1990s. This 
evolution was significantly influenced by rapid developments in the theory of monetary policy. 
Inflation targeting has established itself as the dominant framework for monetary policy 
decisions,” as explained in Baltensperger, Hildebrand, Jordan (2007), Bernanke B S (1979 -
2013). For example, the monetary policy at the SNB includes the three-part monetary policy 
strategy in Swiss National Bank Quarterly Bulletin (2013): “1) First, it regards prices as stable 
when the national consumer price index (CPI) rises by less than 2% per annum. This allows it to 
take account of the fact that the CPI slightly overstates actual inflation. At the same time, it 
allows inflation to fluctuate somewhat with the economic cycle. 2) Second, the SNB summarises 
its assessment of the situation and of the need for monetary policy action in a quarterly inflation 
forecast. This forecast, which is based on the assumption of a constant short-term interest rate, 
shows how the SNB expects the CPI to move over the next three years. 3) Third, the SNB sets its 
operational goal in the form of a target range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor. In addition, 
a minimum exchange rate against the euro is currently in place.” However, there is a strong need 
for the unconventional monetary policy introduction, because of the existing economic crisis in 
the Western Europe and North America (see the most recent data on the GDP in the Switzerland, 
Euro area, U.S.A., U.K. in Fig. 1 in Swiss National Bank Financial Stability Report (2012), and 
the U.S. Federal Reserve System, European Central bank, Bank of Japan and Bank of England 
main interest rates in Fig. 2 in Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth chart (after Swiss National Bank Financial 
Stability Report (2012)). 
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Fig. 2. U.S. Federal Reserve System, European Central bank, Bank of Japan and Bank of 
England main interest rates (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
 
The true meaning of quantitative easing expression, introduced by Werner R A in 1995, is 
to increase the net credit creation in the four possible ways in Werner (2009): 
1) by increasing bank credit, 
2) by increasing trade credit, 
3) by increasing central bank credit, and 
4) by increasing credit created by the government. 
The Bank of Japan used the quantitative easing expression to describe its monetary 
policy to increase the Bank of Japan reserves. The Japanese expression for the quantitative 
easing (量的金融緩和, ryōteki kin'yū kanwa) was frequently used by the Bank of Japan in 
Japan in Bank of Japan (2001), Hiroshi Fujiki et al (2001), Shirakawa (2002). The concise 
definition of the quantitative easing policy is provided in Wikipedia (2013): “Quantitative 
Easing (QE) is an unconventional monetary policy used by central banks to stimulate the 
national economy when standard monetary policy has become ineffective in Bank of England 
(2011a). A central bank implements quantitative easing by buying financial assets from 
commercial banks and other private institutions, thus creating money and injecting a pre-
determined quantity of money into the economy. This is distinguished from the more usual 
policy of buying or selling government bonds to change money supply, in order to keep market 
interest rates at a specified target value in Bank of England (2011b). Expansionary monetary 
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policy typically involves the central bank buying short-term government bonds in order to lower 
short-term market interest rates in European Central Bank (2008). However, when short-term 
interest rates are either at, or close to, zero, normal monetary policy can no longer lower interest 
rates. Quantitative easing may then be used by the monetary authorities to further stimulate the 
economy by purchasing assets of longer maturity than only short-term government bonds, and 
thereby lowering longer-term interest rates further out on the yield curve in Bernanke (2009). 
Quantitative easing raises the prices of the financial assets bought, which lowers their yield in 
Larry (2009). Quantitative easing can be used to help ensure that inflation does not fall below 
target in Bank of England (2011b). Risks include the policy being more effective than intended 
in acting against deflation – leading to higher inflation in Bowlby (2009) or of not being effective 
enough if banks do not lend out the additional reserves in Isidore (2010). According to the IMF 
and various other economists, quantitative easing undertaken since the global financial crisis has 
mitigated the adverse effects of the crisis in Klyuev, de Imus, Srinivasan (2009).” 
Let us sum up the above information by saying that, the quantitative easing policy 
introduction and implementation means that the central bank releases the sufficient capital to the 
commercial and investment banks in order to add the liquidity to the national banking system 
with the goal to improve the existing situation in the national economy. 
Let us briefly review the present developments toward the QE policy implementation 
with the help of the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) in the U.S.A. in Christensen, Rudebusch 
(2012), D’Amico, King (2011), Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, Sack (2011). The U.S. Federal 
Reserve System held between US$700 billion and US$800 billion of Treasury notes on its 
balance sheet before the recession. Presently, the U.S. Federal Reserve System holds around 
US$2.5-3.0 trillion of bank debt, mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury notes in Wikipedia 
(2013). The U.S. Federal Reserve System conducted the following QE programs in Wikipedia 
(2013): 
1. QE1: the purchase of US$600 billion in the mortgage-backed securities in 2008 - 
2010; 
2. QE2: the purchase of US$600 billion in the treasury securities in 2010 - 2011; 
3. QE3: the purchase of US$40 billion of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) per 
month since September, 2012 until 2015. 
Christensen, Rudebusch (2012), Fawley, Neely (2013) summarized the information on some of 
the U.S. Federal Reserve System QE programs announcements in Tabs. 1, 2. The U.S. Federal 
Reserve bank assets are shown in Fig. 3 in Fawley, Neely (2013). 
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Tab. 1. U.S. Federal Reserve System Key QE Announcements 
(after Christensen, Rudebusch (2012)). 
 
Tab. 2. U.S. Federal Reserve System Important QE Announcements 
(after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
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Fig. 3. U.S. Federal Reserve bank assets (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
 
Let us briefly summarize the present developments as far as the QE policy 
implementation is concerned in the U.K in Benford, Berry, Nikolov, Young (2009), Fisher 
(2010a, 2010b), Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011), Bridges, Rossiter, Thomas (2011), Joyce, Lasaosa, 
Stevens, Tong (2011). The main completed QE programs by the Bank of England are listed 
below in Wikipedia (2013): 
1. The Bank of England had purchased around £165 billion of assets in 2008 - 2009. 
2. The Bank of England had increased the total asset purchases up to £175 billion in 
2009 – 2010. 
3. The Bank of England had increased the total asset purchases up to £250 billion as of 
2011. 
4. The Bank of England had increased the total asset purchases up to £375 billion in 
2011 - 2012. 
Christensen, Rudebusch (2012), Fawley, Neely (2013), Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011) summarized 
some of the Bank of England QE programs announcements in Tabs. 3, 4 , 5. The Bank of 
England assets are shown in Fin. 4 in Fawley, Neely (2013). 
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Tab. 3. Bank of England key QE announcements (after Christensen, Rudebusch (2012)). 
 
 
 
Tab. 4. Bank of England important QE announcements (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
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Tab. 5. Bank of England key QE announcements (after Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011)). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Bank of England assets (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
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Let us take a close look on the QE policy implementation in Japan. The completed QE 
programs by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) are listed below in Bank of Japan (2001), Hiroshi Fujiki et 
al (2001), Shirakawa (2002), Wikipedia (2013): 
1. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) increased the commercial bank current account balance 
from ¥5 trillion Yen to ¥35 trillion Yen (approximately US$300 billion) over a 4-year 
period starting in March, 2001-2004.  
2. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) announced that it would purchase of ¥5 trillion Yen 
(US$60 billion) in assets in early October, 2010. 
3. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) announced a unilateral move to increase the amount 
from ¥40 trillion Yen (US$504 billion) to a total of ¥50 trillion Yen (US$630 billion) on 
August 4, 2011. 
4. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) expanded its asset purchase program by ¥5 trillion Yen 
(US$66 billion) to a total of ¥55 trillion Yen in October, 2011. 
Fawley, Neely (2013) analyzed the Bank of Japan important QE announcements in Tab. 
6; and provided information on the Bank of Japan assets in Fig. 5. 
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Tab. 6. Bank of Japan important QE announcements (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Bank of Japan assets (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
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Berkmen (2012) analyzed the Bank of Japan current account balance and balance sheet as 
shown in Figs. 6 and 7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Bank of Japan current account balance (after Berkmen (2012)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Bank of Japan balance sheet (after Berkmen (2012)). 
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Wieland (2010) researched some issues in the QE policy introduction and implementation 
in Japan, presenting the characteristic dependences in the Figs. 8, 9 and 10. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. The Marshallian k and the money market rate in Japan, 1981–2008, annual observations 
(after Wieland (2010)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. The base money and M1 relative to nominal income in Japan, 1981–2008, quarterly 
observations (after Wieland (2010)). 
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Fig. 10. Base money and CPI inflation in Japan, 1981–2008, quarterly observations 
(after Wieland (2010)). 
 
Assenmacher-Wesche, Gerlach, Sekine (2007) also refer to an important remark, made by 
Governor Mieno in testimony to the Diet in May 1987: “We have paid attention to the 
developments of the money supply, as history not only in Japan but also in other countries 
suggests that in the long run a higher money growth rate tends to result in a higher inflation rate. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between money and inflation is much more complicated than a 
simple causal relationship implying that a certain rate of money growth will always result in a 
specified rise of inflation. For this reason, it is very difficult to determine the appropriate level of 
monetary aggregates and we need to rely on overall judgment based on all available information 
at the time.” 
Assenmacher-Wesche, Gerlach, Sekine (2007) came to the following important 
conclusion: “the band spectral regressions indicate that money growth is correlated – and output 
growth is inversely correlated – with inflation in the low frequency band, in particular when that 
is defined as frequencies of four years or more. Furthermore, that correlation reflects 
unidirectional Granger causality from money growth to inflation, implying that money growth 
does contain information about future inflation that is not already embedded in inflation. In the 
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high frequency band the quantity-theoretic variables appear to be of little significance for 
inflation.” 
In Tab. 7, the Bank of Japan monetary base target and balance sheet projection are shown 
in Bank of Japan (2013). 
 
 
Tab. 7. Bank of Japan monetary base target and balance sheet projection 
(after Bank of Japan (2013)). 
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Fawley, Neely (2013) researched the QE policy implementation by the European Central 
Bank, presenting the research data in Tab. 8; and showing the European Central Bank assets in 
Fig. 11. 
 
Tab. 8. European Central Bank Important QE Announcements (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
 
 
Fig. 11. European Central Bank assets (after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
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Fawley, Neely (2013) present a comparative analysis of the monetary base expansion data 
and M2 data in the USA, European Union, Japan and UK in Fig. 12. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Monetary Base and M2 Expansion in USA European Union, Japan and UK 
(after Fawley, Neely (2013)). 
 
Finally, let us explain that the various problems on the QE policy implementation were 
comprehensively researched by many other scientists as reviewed in Fawley, Neely (2013): 
“Academics have already conducted substantial research on recent QE programs. Stroebel and 
Taylor (2009), Kohn (2009), Meyer and Bomfim (2010), and Gagnon et al. (2011a,b), for 
example, study the Fed’s 2008-09 QE programs. Gagnon et al.’s (2011a,b) announcement study 
finds that large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) announcements reduced U.S. long-term yields. 
Joyce et al. (2011) find that the BOE’s QE program had bond yield effects quantitatively similar 
to those reported by Gagnon et al. (2011a,b) for the U.S. program. Hamilton and Wu (2011) 
indirectly calculate the effects of the Fed’s 2008-09 QE programs with a term structure model. 
Neely (2012) evaluates the effect of the Fed’s 2008-09 QE on international long bond yields and 
exchange rates, showing that the effects are consistent with a simple portfolio balance model and 
long-run purchasing power parity.”  
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Discussion on some aspects of quantitative easing policy implementation 
 
Sibert (2010) made the analytic research on the quantitative easing policy, showing the 
US Federal Reserve System simplified balance sheet in Tab. 9. 
 
 
 
Tab. 9. US Federal Reserve System simplified balance sheet (after Sibert (2010)). 
 
Sibert (2010) explains the essence of the monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve 
System in the normal times: "In normal times it is typical for modern central banks to make 
monetary policy by choosing a target short-term policy interest rate. The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System targets the federal funds rate, the rate at 
which private deposit-taking institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve overnight to each 
other. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting as agent for the FOMC, conducts open-
market operations to attain this targeted rate. In usual times this entails offsetting transitory 
changes in depository institutions’ reserves. If the central bank wants to increase these reserves it 
engages in repurchase agreements (“repos”). These operations are equivalent to short-term 
collateralized loans but technically they are arrangements where the Federal Reserve buys 
securities in exchange for reserves and agrees to subsequently resell them. As a result, the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet temporarily expands: the monetary base component of its 
liabilities rises, as does the repo component of its assets. If the Federal Reserve wants to 
decrease depository institutions’ reserves it engages in reverse repos. These are similar to short-
term collateralized borrowing but technically they are an arrangement where the Federal Reserve 
sells assets in exchange for reserves and agrees to of the Federal Reserve’s liabilities: the 
monetary base component falls and the reverse repo component rises. To offset more permanent 
factors that would keep the federal funds rate from its target, the Federal Reserve must make a 
more permanent change in its balance sheet. To permanently increase liquidity the Federal 
Reserve expands its balance sheet: purchasing securities and increasing the monetary base. To 
decrease liquidity it contracts its balance sheet: selling securities and decreasing the monetary 
base." 
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Sibert (2010) the essence of the monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve System in the 
times of crisis: "Unfortunately for the FOMC, as well as other monetary policy committees 
around the world, by the time the global financial crisis started in earnest in September 2008, 
policy interest rates were already quite low and there was little scope to reduce them further... As 
seen in Figure 13 below, the federal funds target rate was 2.0 percent in September 2008; by 
December of that year it had been reduced to 0 - .25 percent. 
Unable to make monetary policy by announcing lower target interest rates and achieving 
them through open-market operations, central banks have sought alternatives. A potential idea 
was that instead of announcing a policy interest rate, the central bank would simply engage in 
further expansionary open-market operations, selling home-currency denominated securities 
to increase the monetary base. This idea, referred to then as quantitative easing, was tried in 
Japan in 2000." 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. US Federal Reserve System target interest rates(after Sibert (2010)). 
 
Sibert (2010) further explains: "In an attempt to free up illiquid markets and deal with 
failed financial institutions, central banks began to explore more unusual types of monetary 
policy. In the United States, the Federal Reserve bought the debt of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac 
and the Federal Home Loan banks, as well as mortgage-backed obligations guaranteed by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae. It also engaged in other crisis-related activities such 
as the creation of the Maiden Lanes I, II and III vehicles. As shown in Figure 14 below, between 
the end of 2007 and the end of 2008 the assets of the Federal Reserve System mushroomed from 
about $915 billion to $2,316 billion." 
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Fig. 14. US Federal Reserve System assets composition (after Sibert (2010)). 
 
Sibert (2010) attracts some attention to the fact that there are the considerable growing 
global imbalances between the national economies of various countries as shown in Fig. 15. 
Sibert (2010) writes: "The consternation undoubtedly reflects some genuine concern that QEII 
might be effective and that a lower real value of the dollar will threaten the ability of other 
countries to pursue export-led growth. However, this is probably not the entire reason: the anger, 
as well as recent the furor over currency wars is a symptom of the dissatisfaction with global 
imbalances." 
 
 
Fig. 15. Global imbalances, in billions of US dollars (after Sibert (2010)). 
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Discussing the QE program opportunities, Bank of England (2009) explains: “Normally, 
central banks do not intervene in private sector asset markets by buying or selling private sector 
debt. But in exceptional circumstances, such intervention may be warranted – for example, when 
corporate credit markets became blocked as the financial crisis intensified towards the end of 
2008. Bank of England purchases of private sector debt can help to unblock corporate credit 
markets, by reassuring market participants that there is a ready buyer should they wish to sell. 
That should help bring down the cost of borrowing, making it easier and cheaper for companies 
to raise finance which they can then invest in their business.” 
In Fig. 16 the Bank of England assets purchases scheme is shown in Bank of England 
(2009). 
 
Fig. 16. Bank of England assets purchases scheme (after Bank of England (2009)). 
 
Benford, Berry, Nikolov, Young (2009) write: “The Bank of England is the sole supplier 
of central bank money in sterling. As well as banknotes, central bank money takes the form of 
reserve balances held by banks at the Bank of England. These balances are used to make 
payments between different banks. The Bank can create new money electronically by increasing 
the balance on a reserve account. So when the Bank purchases an asset from a bank, for example, 
it simply credits that bank’s reserve account with the additional funds. This generates an 
expansion in the supply of central bank money.” 
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Benford, Berry, Nikolov, Young (2009) note: “Asset purchases are a natural extension of 
the Bank’s conventional monetary policy operations. In normal circumstances, the Bank of 
England provides reserves according to the demand from banks at the prevailing level of Bank 
Rate. When conducting asset purchases, the Bank is seeking to influence the quantity of money 
in the economy by injecting additional reserves. This does not mean though that the Bank no 
longer has influence over market interest rates. Market interest rates will continue to be affected 
both by the level of Bank Rate and, in addition, by the amount of reserves that the Bank is 
injecting as investors react to the additional money that they hold in their portfolios.” 
Benford, Berry, Nikolov, Young (2009) explain: “Money is highly liquid because it can 
easily be used to buy goods and services or other assets. The increase in private sector liquidity 
will depend on the liquidity of the assets that are being exchanged for money. There are a 
number of channels through which greater liquidity can have an impact. Three key channels are 
set out below. The transmission mechanism is also summarized in Figure 17.” 
 
 
Fig. 17. Stylized transmission mechanism for asset purchases (after Benford, Berry, Nikolov, 
Young (2009)). 
 
Benford, Berry, Nikolov, Young (2009) discuss the exit strategy from the QE policy: 
“Monetary policy could be tightened in a number of ways. It could involve some combination of 
increases in Bank Rate and sales of assets in order to reduce the supply of money in the 
economy. Alternatively, the supply of reserves could be reduced without asset sales, through the 
issuance of short-term Bank of England bills.” 
Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011) made the research on the design, operation and impact of the 
Bank’s asset purchase program that began in 2009 in response to the intensification of the 
financial crisis. Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011) write: “When financial markets are dysfunctional, 
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central bank asset purchases can improve market functioning by increasing liquidity through 
actively encouraging trading. Asset prices may therefore increase through lower premia for 
illiquidity. The effects of this channel may, however, only persist while the monetary authority is 
conducting asset purchases.” 
In Fig. 18, the Quantitative Easing (QE) transmission channels are shown in Joyce, 
Tong, Woods (2011). 
 
 
Fig. 18. Quantitative Easing (QE) transmission channels (after Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011)). 
 
Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011) mention that the estimates of the macroeconomic impact of 
QE can be done, using the following models: 
1. SVAR approach: A common approach is to characterize QE solely through its effects on 
longer-maturity government bond yields. The simplest starting point for this kind of 
analysis is to use a small structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) containing the policy 
rate, a government bond yield (the ten-year spot rate), real GDP growth and CPI 
inflation. A ‘QE shock’ can be identified by assuming that a negative shock to bond 
yields leads to a contemporaneous rise in GDP and CPI inflation, but has no effect on 
policy rates (which are constrained at the zero bound). Estimating this model using 
quarterly UK data over a sample period predating the crisis (1992 Q1 to 2007 Q2), and 
shocking the ten-year gilt yield by 100 basis points, results in a peak impact on the level 
of real GDP of just under 1.5 % and a peak effect on annual CPI inflation of about ¾ 
percentage points. These effects should be taken as illustrative, given the simplicity of the 
model and the fact that it has been estimated on a sample predating the crisis. 
Furthermore, in looking at an impulse response, the assumption is that QE is similar to a 
typical one-period shock to bond yields. This implies rather less persistence than might 
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be expected if QE has operated primarily through a portfolio balance effect. Despite these 
caveats, the effects on key macro variables appear economically significant. 
2. Multiple time-series models approach: It is also possible to use more sophisticated 
econometric models to look at this issue. Kapetanios et al (2011) use three different time-
series models of varying complexity to conduct counterfactual forecasts of the effects of 
QE. The approach (broadly similar in spirit to Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010)) is to use 
these models to conduct conditional forecasts under ‘policy’ and ‘no policy’ scenarios 
and then to attribute the difference in the resulting forecasts to the effects of the policy. In 
the no policy scenario, it is assumed that without QE five and ten-year gilt yields would 
have been 100 basis points higher, although a variety of alternative scenarios are also 
examined. Averaging across the models suggests that QE had a peak effect on the level 
of GDP of around 1 ½ % and a peak effect on annual CPI inflation of about 1 ¼ % 
percentage points. These estimates vary considerably across the individual model 
specifications, and with the assumptions made to generate the counterfactual forecasts, 
suggesting they are subject to considerable uncertainty. 
3. Monetary approach: An alternative method of estimating the effects of QE is to focus on 
its impact on the money supply. Bridges and Thomas (2011) first calculate the impact of 
QE on the money supply, allowing for the various other influences on broad money over 
the period. They then apply their estimates to two econometric models — an aggregate 
SVAR model and a linked set of sectoral money demand systems — that allow them to 
calculate how asset prices and spending need to adjust to make money demand consistent 
with the increase in broad money supply. Their preferred model estimates suggest that 
the higher money supply resulting from QE may have boosted the level of GDP by 
around 2 % and CPI inflation by about 1%, though again these estimates are subject to a 
lot of uncertainty. 
4. Bottom-up approach: Ideally one would want to make an assessment using a properly 
specified structural model. But no such model embodying all the relevant transmission 
channels discussed earlier appears to exist. The forecasting model used by the Bank of 
England, in common with most large-scale macroeconomic models, does not explain risk 
premia and therefore does not embody a portfolio balance channel. But, to make a rough 
calculation, one can take a more bottom-up approach. More specifically, the effects of the 
QE policy can be broken down into two main elements: (1) the impact of asset purchases 
on gilt prices and other asset prices and (2) the effect of asset prices on demand and 
hence inflation. 
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A number of ways of estimating (1) were already discussed above. The analysis 
of the QE announcement effects suggested that asset purchases pushed down medium to 
long-term gilt yields by about 100 basis points. The effect of QE on a broader range of 
asset prices is much more uncertain, but there was an immediate 70 basis points fall in 
investment-grade corporate bond yields and a 150 basis points fall in sub-investment 
grade yields. There is considerable uncertainty about the effect on equity prices and the 
immediate market reaction is unlikely to provide an accurate guide, but an estimated 
portfolio balance model would suggest an impact of around 20 %. Combining these 
effects on government and corporate bonds and equity prices suggests an overall boost to 
households’ net financial wealth of about 16 %. 
To quantify the next leg in the transmission mechanism, between asset prices and 
demand, a range of simple models may be used. To calculate the impact on consumer 
spending, it is necessary to calculate the wealth elasticity of consumption. One way of 
doing this is to make an annuity calculation, assuming that households perceive the 
policy’s effects as long-lasting and want to spend their extra wealth evenly over their 
lifetimes. To calculate the effects on business and dwellings investment, one can use Q 
models, where the incentive to invest depends on the market value of capital relative to 
its replacement cost. Higher asset prices should raise the market value of capital and 
reduce the cost of finance, boosting investment spending. Allowing for reasonable 
uncertainty about the initial impact on asset prices, the result of these sorts of calculations 
would suggest a peak impact on the level of real GDP of between ¾ % and 2 ½ %. 
Tab. 10 shows the estimates of the macroeconomic impact of QE, peak impact on the 
level of output and inflation in Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011). 
 
 
 
Tab. 10. Estimates of the macroeconomic impact of QE, peak impact on the level of output and 
inflation (after Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011)). 
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Joyce, Tong, Woods (2011) conclude: “These estimates are clearly highly uncertain, 
particularly as none of the methods used to produce them fully capture all the likely transmission 
channels set out earlier, but they do suggest that the effects of QE were economically 
significant.” 
Krogstrup, Reynard, Sutter (2012) make a research supposition that the expansion in 
reserves following recent quantitative easing programs of the Federal Reserve may have affected 
the long-term interest rates through liquidity effects. Krogstrup, Reynard, Sutter (2012) define of 
the liquidity effect as: “The liquidity effect is the impact of an expansion of the central bank’s 
liabilities on bond yields, irrespective of the type of asset the central bank buys.” The estimates 
suggest that between January 2009 and 2011, 10-year US Treasury yields fell 46-85 basis points 
as a result of liquidity effects in Krogstrup, Reynard, Sutter (2012). Finally, Krogstrup, Reynard, 
Sutter (2012) come to the conclusion: “… the large scale asset purchases carried out by the 
Federal Reserve may have had liquidity effects due to increases in reserves as well as portfolio 
balance effects of the changes in the supply of Treasury outstanding to the public. Failing to take 
into account such liquidity effects could lead to an underestimation of the impact of the large 
scale asset purchase programs on long-term government bond yields. While correlation is not 
causality, preliminary evidence suggests that reserves and yields were indeed correlated during 
the ZLB period, and that this correlation points to economically important effects. Thus, liquidity 
effects may have reduced long-term yields by 46 to 85 basis points due to the increase in 
reserves of about 2.5 percentage points of GDP between January 2009 and January 2011.” 
In addition, let us explain that Iino, Iyetomi (2012) researched the Japanese transaction 
network consisting of about 800 thousand firms (nodes) and four million business relations 
(links) with focus on its modular structure in Fig. 19. Iino, Iyetomi (2012) write: “Networks 
formed by firms through their mutual transactions are a manifestation of economic activities. 
This is a new way to study economic phenomena emphasizing importance of interaction between 
economic agents. A number of researches on complex networks have been carried out from a 
physical point of view. The endeavors encompass development of statistical mechanics methods 
for quantifying network structure, construction of theoretical models for network formation and 
visualization of networks based on a physical model.” We believe that the capital flows 
propagation in the transaction networks channels, created by the complex interconnected 
transaction networks between the firms, banks and the US Federal Reserve System, may have an 
influence on the QE policy implementation in the US financial system. 
Let us summarize the above research findings by saying that, in our opinion, the 
Quantitative Easing (QE) transmission channels together with the transaction networks channels 
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play an important role during the QE policy implementation in the US financial system. 
Therefore, the nonlinearities, originated in the Quantitative Easing (QE) transmission channels 
and the transaction networks channels in the financial system, need to be investigated properly. 
 
Fig. 19. The Japanese transaction network drawn in three-dimensional space by a spring-
electrical model. Dots in these images represent nodes (firms) whose communities are 
distinguished by colors. The image (a) shows the whole network. The images (b) and (c) 
illuminate only the first and second largest communities, respectively. And those communities 
are further decomposed into sub-communities as displayed with different colors. The first and 
second largest sub-communities in the largest community are selected in (d) and (e), respectively 
(after Iino, Iyetomi (2012)). 
 
Nonlinear dynamic chaos generation by turbulent capital f lows in QE 
transmission channels  and transactions network channels  
in US financial system 
 
The modeling of the USA economy can be completed with the application of the VAR 
model with the Smets-Wouters model, making it possible to provide the reasonably accurate 
forecasts for the economic series in the selected model Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, Wouters 
(2007), FRED (2013), Kimball (1995), Lutkepohl (2006), NBER (2013), Smets-Wouters (2002, 
2004, 2007). The Smets-Wouters model is a nonlinear system of equations in the form of a 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that seeks to characterize an economy 
derived from the economic first principles in Smets-Wouters (2002, 2004, 2007). The considered 
model works with the eight time series: output, prices, wages, hours worked, interest rates, 
consumption, investment, unemployment in Matlab (2012). 
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Let us consider the results on the modeling of the USA economy, which are shown in 
Figs. 20 - 26 in Matlab (2012). 
 
Fig. 20. Plots of time series with shaded bands that identify periods of economic recession as 
determined by NBER (after Matlab (2012)). 
 
Fig. 21. "Optimal" number of autoregressive lags based on the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) (after Matlab (2012)). 
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Fig. 22. Forecast accuracy of model for 1-year horizon (after Matlab (2012)). 
 
Fig. 23. Model calibration to December 31, 2008 (after Matlab (2012)). 
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Fig. 24. Model calibration to March 31, 2009 (after Matlab (2012)). 
 
Fig. 25. Projected dynamic responses of each time series along each column in reaction to a 1 
standard deviation impulse along each row. The units for each plot are percentage deviations 
from the initial state for each time series (after Matlab (2012)). 
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Fig. 26. Real GDP forecast in the US economy (after Matlab (2012)). 
 
We would like to comment that the general approach to the modeling of the US economy 
can be based on both: 
1) the "large" empirically-motivated regression model, and 
2) the Value at Risk (VAR) model with the incorporated Smets-Wouters model. 
Let us note that the above two approaches don’t take to the account an origination of the 
nonlinear dynamic chaos during the capital flow in the quantitative easing transmission channels 
and the transaction networks channels in the US financial system at the time of the QE policy 
implementation by the US Federal Reserve System. 
Therefore, we completed the computer modeling, using both the Nonlinear Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium Theory (NDSGET) and the Hydrodynamics Theory (HT), to 
accurately characterize the US economy in the conditions of the QE policy implementation by 
the US Federal Reserve, because, in our opinion, the nonlinear dynamic chaos can be generated 
by the turbulent capital flows in the QE transmission channels in the US financial system in 
Kolmogorov (1941), Landau (1944, 2001), Feigenbaum (1979, 1980). In this connection, we 
focused our attention on a set of the important financial questions in (see the book on the 
nonlinearities in microwave superconductivity in D O Ledenyov, V O Ledenyov (2012)): 
1. How does the laminar – turbulent transition in the QE transmission channels and the 
transaction networks channels in the US financial system occur? 
2. How does the inflow of capital with the turbulent spectrum in the QE transmission 
channels and the transaction networks channels impact the macroeconomics situations 
in the US economy? 
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3. How does the inflow of capital with the turbulent spectrum influence the business 
cycle’s characteristics during the business cycle’s propagation in and interaction with 
the US financial and economic systems? 
4. Will the degree of nonlinearity of the US financial and economic systems increase as 
a result of the increase of capital flows with the turbulent spectrum in the QE 
transmission channels during the QE policy introduction and implementation by the 
US Federal Reserve System? 
Aiming to clarify the above research problems, we developed the two complex recursive 
algorithms and applied the parallel computing techniques to complete the computer modeling 
with the goal to accurately characterize the impulse responses by the US financial and economic 
systems to the changing levels of liquidity due to the QE program implementation. For example, 
we completed the following computer simulations: 
1) the dependence of the capital flows propagation in the quantitative easing transmission 
channels in the US financial system over the specified time period, and 
2) the dependence of the capital flows propagation in the transaction networks channels, 
created by the complex interconnected transaction networks between the firms, banks and the US 
Federal Reserve System, in the US financial system over the certain time period. 
In our research, the cross-sections of both the quantitative easing transmission channels 
and the transaction networks channels have the complex dependencies on a number of the 
financial and economic variables in the US financial system. Using the knowledge base in the 
econophysics, we assumed that the nonlinear dynamic chaos can be generated by the turbulent 
capital flows in both the quantitative easing transmission channels and the transaction networks 
channels in the US financial system, when there are the laminar - turbulent capital flows 
transitions. We demonstrated that the capital flows in the quantitative easing transmission 
channels and the transaction networks channels in the US financial system can be accurately 
characterized by the Reynolds numbers in Reynolds (1883): 
 
 
where d is the characteristic geometric dimension of researched system, ν is the coefficient of 
kinematic viscosity, υ is the characteristic velocity of capital flow. We think that the transition to 
the nonlinear dynamic chaos regime of the US financial system operation can be realized through 
the cascade of the Landau – Hopf bifurcations in the turbulent capital flows in both the 
quantitative easing transmission channels and the transaction networks channels in the US 
financial system in Landau (1944, 2001), Hopf (1948). We found that the ability of the US 
Re ,dν
υ
=
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financial system to adjust to the different levels of liquidity strongly depends on the 
nonlinearities appearance in the QE transmission channels, and it is limited by the laminar – 
turbulent capital flows transitions in the QE transmission channels and the transaction networks 
channels in the US financial system. In our opinion, one of the interesting modeling results is 
that the main purpose of liquidity adding into the US financial system is to stabilize the US 
financial system; however, we found that the instabilities may appear at the certain levels of 
added liquidity in the QE transmission channels in the US financial system, because of the 
laminar – turbulent capital flows transitions, resulting in the switching to the nonlinear dynamic 
chaos regime of the US financial system operation. Therefore, we made an important conclusion 
that the QE program implementation may stabilize or destabilize the US financial system, 
depending on the level of added liquidity in the US financial system over some time period. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central banks introduced a series of quantitative easing programs and decreased the 
long term interest rates to near zero with the aim to ease the credit conditions and provide the 
liquidity into the financial systems, responding to the 2007-2013 financial crisis in the USA, UK, 
Western Europe, and Japan. We reviewed the U.S. Federal Reserve System, European Central 
bank, Bank of England and Bank of Japan monetary and financial policies with the particular 
focus on the quantitative easing policy implementation in the USA. Discussing some aspects of 
the quantitative easing policy implementation, we highlighted the fact that the levels of capital 
may change quickly in the quantitative easing transmission channels and in the transaction 
networks channels during the quantitative easing policy implementation, when the liquidity is 
added to the financial system. In agreement with the recent research findings in the 
econophysics, we propose that the nonlinear dynamic chaos can be generated by the turbulent 
capital flows in quantitative easing transmission channels and in the transaction networks 
channels, when the laminar capital flows transform to the turbulent capital flows in the US 
financial system. We demonstrated that the capital flows in both the quantitative easing 
transmission channels and the transaction networks channels in the US financial system can be 
accurately characterized by the Reynolds numbers. We explained that the transition to the 
nonlinear dynamic chaos regime can be realized through the cascade of the Landau – Hopf 
bifurcations during the turbulent capital flows in both the quantitative easing transmission 
channels and the transaction networks channels in the US financial system. Finally, we clarify 
that the general approach to the modeling of the US economy is based on both 1) the "large" 
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empirically-motivated regression model, and 2) the Value at Risk (VAR) model with the 
incorporated Smets-Wouters model, which don’t take to the account the origination of the 
nonlinear dynamic chaos regime during the capital flow in the quantitative easing transmission 
channels and in the transaction networks channels in the US financial system. Therefore, we 
completed the computer modeling, using both the Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Theory (NDSGET) and the Hydrodynamics Theory (HT), to accurately characterize 
the US economy in the conditions of the QE policy implementation by the US Federal Reserve 
System. We found that the ability of the US financial system to adjust to the different levels of 
liquidity strongly depends on the nonlinearities appearance in the QE transmission channels, and 
is limited by the laminar – turbulent capital flow transitions in the QE transmission channels at 
the US financial system operation. The developed computer model allows us to make the very 
accurate long- and short- time forecasts of the US economy performance in the cases, when the 
different levels of liquidity are added into the US financial system. 
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